The Timing of Equity Issuance: Adverse Selection  Costs or Sentiment? by Tang, Minrou
  
The Timing of Equity Issuance: Adverse Selection Costs or Sentiment? 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
                              Graduate Studies and Research 
                          In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
                         For the Degree of Master of Science in Finance 
                     In the Department of Finance and Management Science 
                               Edwards School of Business 
                               University of Saskatchewan 
                             Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada 
 
 
By 
Minrou Tang 
 
© Copyright, Minrou Tang, September 2015. All rights reserved.  
 i 
 
Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University 
may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying 
of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted 
by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by 
the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was 
done. It is understood that any copying, publication, or use of this thesis or parts thereof 
for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also 
understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of 
Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business 
University of Saskatchewan 
25 Campus Drive 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada 
S7N 5A7
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
Abstract 
 
This study constructs a two-step model to test the most prominent market timing factors. 
We decompose equity issuances into 1) firm-specific components, which are predicted 
by firms’ characteristics, and 2) market-wide components, which are predicted by 
aggregate time series measures. Our evidence shows that, at the firm level, firms with 
higher market-to-book ratio, smaller size, more growth opportunities, and fewer 
tangible assets are more likely to issue equity. At the aggregate level, a greater 
proportion of firms issue equity in years with higher aggregate market-to-book ratio 
and lower asymmetric information. After controlling for the aggregate market-to-book 
ratio and information asymmetry, sentiment has no direct effect on equity issuance. This 
paper provides direct evidence that firms time their favorable market conditions to 
reduce adverse selection costs, and to exploit higher individual security valuations or 
capture growth opportunities.  
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The Timing of Equity Issuance: Adverse Selection Costs or 
Sentiment? 
1. Introduction 
Firms decide to issue equity for different reasons. From the firm-specific side, firms 
issue equity to raise capital for operating, expanding, or financing investment 
opportunities. Alternatively, firms issue equity to reduce (or to avoid increasing) debt 
to reduce bankruptcy costs. From a market-wide perspective, equity issuance decisions 
can indicate an attempt to take advantage of favorable market conditions. Of course, 
both reasons might apply. 
It is seen that the number of firms issuing equity and the dollar value of these 
issues varies greatly over time. Based on the data of US stock market from 1963 to 
2014, over 30% of all firms issue equity in some years, and this percentage might fall 
below 5% in other years. The same goes for the value of issues when we look at the US 
stock market from 1963 to 2014: in some years the value of equity issued as a fraction 
of outstanding assets exceeds 3.2%, while in other years this percentage is below 
0.3%. One widely accepted explanation for the large intertemporal variation in equity 
issuances and issue volumes is that firms tend to time their issues based on favorable 
market conditions. 
Market timing in the traditional sense hypothesizes that firms take advantage of a 
favorable market value of equity to issue more equity. Hence, individual security 
valuation plays a significant role in financial decisions. When their market value is 
higher than the book value or past market value, firms are more likely to issue equity, 
and when market value is lower than book value or past market value, firms are more 
likely to repurchase equity (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
What drives market-to-book values? One commonly cited factor is investor 
irrationality (Delong, Shleifer, and Waldmann, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
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Shleifer, 2000; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). This factor is drawn from behavioral finance. 
Investor sentiment relates to an estimate of future cash flows and risks that are not based 
on reality. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) believe betting against sentimental investors is 
costly and risky, so classical rational investors are not always capable of pushing or 
pulling stocks prices completely back to their fundamental values. Thus, investor 
sentiment has the power to affect stock prices. These effects can push stock prices 
further away from fundamental values, affect market-to-book ratios, and finally affect 
equity issuances. While it is commonly believed that investor sentiment drives equity 
issuances, to our knowledge, there is little or no direct evidence about the effect of 
sentiment on equity issuances.  
There are two main classes of measures for sentiment: those based on market data 
and those based on surveys. Some authors use the volume of equity issuance as a 
measure or proxy for sentiment. Periods of high IPO and SEO volumes are often 
referred to as ‘hot’ equity or high sentiment periods. For instance, Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Ritter (1991), Baker and Wurgler (2000), Ritter and Welch (2002), Loughran 
and Ritter (2003), Ljunggvist, Nanda and Singh (2006), and Cornelli, Goldreich and 
Ljunggvist (2006) suggest that equity issues as a fraction of total issues might indicate 
periods of high sentiment. In this paper, we are especially interested in Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, which is based on common variation of six underlying 
proxies for sentiment. 
We are not aware of any study that directly tests the effect of Baker and Wurgler’s 
sentiment index (or similar indices) on equity issuances. As far as equity issuances are 
concerned, the indirect measure of sentiment is non-testable: sentiment and equity 
issues are one and the same. This measure has been mainly used to test equity returns. 
For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2000) suggest that equity issues as a fraction of total 
issues could predict future returns. The rationale behind this argument is that sentiment 
drives security valuation and causes firms to issue equity (as opposed to issuing debt). 
As a result, firms that issue equity during these periods experience lower future returns. 
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Firms might time market conditions to reduce adverse selection costs. As in the 
case of sentiment, previous research has used indirect measures of adverse selection 
costs that are problematic. For instance, Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) suggest that 
adverse selection costs are lower during periods of expansion. Hence, the authors 
denote expansionary periods as an indicator of lower adverse selection costs. Again, in 
this setting, direct tests of the effect of adverse selection costs on equity issuances are 
not possible. The authors conclude that firms that issue equity during expansionary 
phases face less severe negative market reaction and that this could be attributed to 
lower adverse selection costs. 
Until now there is no clear evidence on whether sentiment or adverse selection 
costs directly affect equity issuances, let alone whether both operate in the same 
multivariate setting. Authors primarily rely on future stock returns (or announcement 
day abnormal returns) to argue that these issuances might have been conducted during 
periods of high sentiment or low adverse selection costs. The level of equity issues is 
used to indicate investor sentiment, which is especially problematic since equity issues 
are never exogenous. Apart from the market and economy-wide factors, firm 
characteristics affect equity issues as well. This study first uses firm characteristics to 
predict individual firms’ propensities to issue equity and compares these with actual 
issuances. The residual propensity to issue, which is the difference between actual 
proportion of equity issuing firms and the aggregate predicted propensity of firms to 
issue equity, measures the portion of equity issuance that cannot be explained by the 
needs of firms for investment or financial restructuring purposes. This residual is then 
regressed on time series measures of adverse selection costs and investor 
sentiment. Thus, we decompose equity issues into firm-specific and market-wide 
components. Also, we also run competing tests between adverse selection costs and 
investor sentiment. 
The results of this study show that from firm-specific view firms with higher 
market-to-book ratio, lower profitability, smaller size and more growth opportunities 
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are more likely to issue equity; whereas from a market-wide perspective a greater 
proportion firms issue equity (beyond what is explained by firms characteristics) in 
years with higher aggregate market-to-book ratios and lower adverse selection costs. 
However, after controlling for the aggregate market-to-book ratio and adverse selection 
costs, investor sentiment and business cycle factors do not directly affect equity 
issuance decisions. The empirical evidence indicates that firms time their financing 
decisions with favorable market conditions. Firms tend to take advantage of security 
overvaluation or growth opportunities by issuing equity when the aggregate market to 
book ratio is relatively high. Similarly, firms tend to take advantage of reduced 
information asymmetry by issuing equity when the aggregate market synchronicity is 
relatively low. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we go through 
capital structure theory and market timing papers. Data and methodology are explained 
in Section 3. Empirical results are in Section 4. Robustness tests are shown in Section 
5. Our conclusions are given in Section 6. 
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2. Related Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature Review  
2.1.1 Capital Structure Theories 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that the value of a firm is not dependent on its 
leverage. Modigliani and Miller (1963) take tax into consideration, which creates tax 
shield effects. Optimal leverage can be achieved by weighing the trade-off between tax 
benefits (tax shield) and debt costs (agency costs and bankruptcy costs), as stated by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
there is no optimal leverage for a firm but an order of financing choice. Because of the 
adverse selection costs, firms should follow a financing hierarchy: retained earnings are 
the best way, and then comes external debt, and equity is the last source. However, 
Fama and French (2005) show firms’ financial decisions usually violate the pecking 
order theory.  
Additional empirical evidence shows classical theories cannot fully explain 
financial decisions. For instance, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) state financing decisions are more associated with internal deficits than 
with deviation from optimal leverage. Thus, some new theories or explanations are 
needed.  
2.1.2 Market timing 
Many empirical evidences show firms tend to time the market to take advantage of 
favorable market conditions. It is a common phenomenon in the market. Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) document this market timing 
phenomenon in worldwide. Welch (2004) states that past stock prices have strong 
effects on capital structure, which indicates market timing exists. Chichti (2010) gives 
the empirical evidence that equity market timing has persistent effects on leverage. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) show a survey result that two-third of CEOs admit that they 
issue equity relative to their stock prices. 
Market timing means that firms take advantage of favorable market conditions. 
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Individual equity valuation plays a significant role as an indicator of the market 
conditions. Market-to-book ratio is taken as a proxy for individual valuation or growth 
opportunity of firms. Higher market-to-book ratio might be interpreted as being 
overpriced, and lower market-to-book ratio is taken as being undervalued. Firms are 
more likely to issue equity when they realize their firms are overvalued and repurchase 
the equities when stocks are undervalued. Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that market-
to-book ratio can reflect stock valuation, and past cumulative market-to-book ratio has 
a strong and persistent effect on the current capital structure. Elliott, Koeter-Kant and 
Warr (2008) find market-to-book ratio has a significant explanatory power and plays a 
major role in the financial choice decision. However, Hovakimian (2006) states equity 
issuance timing does not have persistent effects on the current leverage. Most empirical 
results show firms are more likely to issue equity with higher market-to-book ratio or 
higher stock prices, and more likely to repurchase equity with lower market-to-book 
ratio or lower stock prices. Higher market-to-book ratio is the indicator for favorable 
market conditions and is used by managers in financing decisions. 
On the other hand, some studies take market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth 
opportunity instead of stock valuation. Higher market-to-book ratio suggests more 
growth opportunities, and lower market-to-book ratio suggests fewer growth 
opportunities. The effect on equity issuances is similar to valuation interpretation in 
such a way that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to issue equity, 
and firms with fewer growth opportunities more likely to repurchase equity. Firms raise 
money by issuing equity when they foresee more growth opportunities and issue less 
when they lack growth opportunities.  
Investor sentiment is also taken as a sign of the market condition. This explanation 
is based on the behavioral finance assumptions. The first assumption, as stated by 
Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), is that investors are subject to 
sentiment. Investor sentiment is defined as an estimation of future cash flows and risks 
that does not depend on fundamentals. The second assumption, as stated by Shleifer 
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and Vishny (1997), is that arbitrage is costly and risky, which indicates that arbitrage 
activities are limited in the real market. Moreover, even rational arbitrageurs are not so 
aggressive in pushing or pulling stock prices back to their fundamentals as assumed in 
classical studies. In this case, investor sentiment might affect prices valuations, and 
predict market conditions. Finally, investor sentiment affects equity issuances by 
affecting stock valuation. Baker and Wurgler (2006) provide evidences that investor 
sentiment could affect stock prices. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyman (1998) use a “bottom up” approach to predict investor 
sentiment, and show how this sentiment affect past returns and fundamentals. In our 
paper, we use Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, which is based on the 
common variation in six underlying proxies for sentiment. 
2.1.3 Adverse selection costs hypothesis 
Adverse selection cost hypothesis has quite a long history, which can start from Myers 
(1984) pecking order theory. Different from behavior finance, this explanation assumes 
investors are rational, and information asymmetry exists between inside managers and 
outside investors. It causes information costs and higher capital costs when firms decide 
to issue equity instead debt. Adverse selection costs make issuing equity a more costly 
source of financing for firms. Firms are only likely to issue equity when they capture 
lower information asymmetric period, which has lower adverse selection costs, to avoid 
high capital costs. According to Lucas and McDonald (1990) adverse selection costs 
vary over time. Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991) find that firms are more likely 
to issue equity after information release, which could reduce information asymmetry. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991) state that 
managers avoid issuing equity during high periods of asymmetric information. Alti 
(2006) provides that firms are more likely to issue equity during hot market compared 
with the cold market.  
Roll (1988) states that the extent to which firm-level and market-level information 
is capitalized can be reflected in stocks co-movement. Stock returns variation includes 
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market-level and firm-specific information. The more firm-specific information is 
impounded into the stock price, the lower information asymmetry exists. Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000) and Kan, Morck and Yang (2004) use asset pricing model to capture 
stock return variation residual, which is a proxy for synchronicity. Higher R2 indicates 
higher synchronicity. When synchronicity is high, stocks tend to move up and down 
together, implying that less firm-specific information exists in the market. Frankel and 
Li (2004) set a model to predict cross-sectional R2 and find that R2 is a reliable proxy 
as a measure of information asymmetry (adverse selection costs). Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004), Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2003), Wurgler (2000), and DeFond and 
Hung (2004) provide evidences that lower stock return synchronicity firms have higher 
level of firm-specific information priced in the stock price, which is consistent with 
previous studies that stock return synchronicity can be stated as a benchmark to 
measure the level of information asymmetry. In summary, lower stock returns 
synchronicity indicates greater firm-specific information is capitalized in stock price, 
less information asymmetry in the market, and less adverse selection costs.  
2.2 Hypotheses 
From the irrational view, market timing phenomenon can be explained by investor 
sentiment. If managers take sentiment into consideration in financial decisions, after 
controlling for firms’ characteristic, we should still capture an effect of sentiment on 
equity issues. 
Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Investor sentiment is significantly and positively associated with equity 
issuance residual propensity. 
From the rational view, market timing can be seen as an attempt to capture the 
favorable market condition to avoid high information costs (adverse selection costs). In 
order to prevent high capital cost, firms might avoid issuing equity or issue more debt 
during high costs period. Lower adverse selection costs indicate a favorable market 
condition, and managers take advantage of this opportunity by issuing more equity. 
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Stock price synchronicity is used as a proxy for adverse selection cost in this paper. 
Years with higher weighted price stock synchronicities are taken as periods of high 
adverse selection costs. Thus, firms should be more likely to issue equity when adverse 
selection costs are lower, and vice versa.  
Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis2: Stock price synchronicity is significantly and negatively associated with 
equity issuance residual propensity. 
Generally, during expansionary phases of the business cycle, capital cost is lower. 
The market is more active, and more investment opportunities are presented to the 
market. Firms will raise more money to capture these investment opportunities or lower 
capital costs. We posit that firms are more likely to issue equity during expansionary 
phases of the business cycle. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample 
Data in this paper is collected from several databases. Basic financial fundamental data 
is acquired from Compustat. Stock returns and market index returns are collected from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Investor sentiment index is taken 
from Baker and Wurgler website. Business cycle indicators are provided by Economic 
Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) website. Interest rates of 1-year-constant maturity 
Treasury bonds are collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
The sample consists of US firms on Compustat and CRSP for the period from 1963 to 
2014. Following previous studies, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms 
(SIC 4900-4999) are excluded. Firms with missing variables and negative assets are 
excluded. The final sample contains 115,497 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Variables  
Variable definitions and constructions are presented in Table 1. Following Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Net Equity Issue is defined as changes in book equity minus changes 
in balance sheet retained earnings divided by total assets. To estimate the yearly equity 
issuance, we use several fundamental variables that affect issuance decisions.  
Profitable firms might issue debt with fewer costs, so profitability might be negatively 
associated with equity issuance decisions. However, higher profits increase firms’ 
financial slacks, which might reduce the need for external funds. Even though the effect 
is not clear, previous studies have found strong effects between profitability and debt 
or equity issuance decisions. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) find ROA negatively 
affects debt issuance, and Pagano and Panetta (1998) find a positive association 
between profitability and equity issuance. And other studies, such as Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Hovakimian (2001, 2006), Elliott and Johanna 
(2008), Titman (2008), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Frank and Goyal (2009) all 
show important role of profitability in financing decisions. We use EBIT divided by 
total asset and EBITDA divided by total asset as proxies for profitability.  
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Studies find that larger firms tend to have more debt and more transparent assets. 
They usually issue more debt because of low fixed costs of debt. Many studies have 
provided consistent results. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian (2001, 2006), 
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2002), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) all document positive effect of firm size on debt issue. 
Following these previous studies, we use the log of total assets and sales as proxies for 
firm size. Following Fama and French (2002), we also control for leverage in the model. 
All else being equal, firms with higher leverage are more likely to issue equity. 
Previous studies also find tangibility has the same effect as the firm size on debt 
issuance decisions. Tangible assets could be used as collateral and are usually 
associated with the capability to bear more debt. Thus, firms with more tangible assets 
tend to issue debt, and firms with more intangible assets prefer equity instead. We use 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets as a proxy for tangibility. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) find leverage is negatively associated with debt 
issuances. Elliott and Johanna (2008) state that firms would like to move towards their 
target leverage in a long-term run. If the leverage of a firm is lower than its target, the 
firm is more likely to issue debt. Titman (2008) confirms this conclusion. We use two 
different definitions for leverage. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), leverage is 
defined as total assets minus book equity divided by total assets. The second definition 
is long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Some studies, including that of Baker and Wurgler (2002), take market-to-book 
ratio as a proxy for security valuation. Fama and French (2002) further state that the 
market-to-book ratio has a significant effect on leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
consider it as a proxy for the investment opportunity. In this paper, we take market-to-
book ratio as a proxy for either stock valuation or growth opportunity. We do not 
distinguish between the two. We use capital expenditure as a proxy for the investment 
opportunity. Higher capital expenditures indicate more investment opportunities and 
more need for external funds. We also use selling, general and administrative expense 
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as another proxy for investment opportunities for robustness tests.  
Growth is associated with financing decisions. As Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Fama and French (2002) contend, firms with more growth opportunities are more likely 
to raise capital. In these paper, the percentage change in total assets is used as a proxy 
for growth. Some papers use capital expenditure divided by total asset as a proxy for 
growth.  
Some studies also find previous stock returns have an effect on current financing 
decisions (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991), Welch (2004), and Titman and Tsyplakov 
(2007)). Thus, we also control for previous year’s stock returns in some regression 
models for robustness tests.  
  
3.3 Methodology 
Many factors have persistent and significant effects on equity issuances. Following 
Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009), Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
other studies, we selected some widely-accepted firm-specific characteristics that firms 
take into consideration in financial decisions. We selected a base period and estimated 
the average coefficients. Then we predict the propensity to issue for the forecast period 
using the average coefficients. The difference between the actual and predicted 
issuances is termed residual propensity to issue. Then we test several market timing 
factors on the residual propensity to issue. The details are in the following part. 
3.3.1 Step I 
Many previous studies have documented some firm-specific characteristics that 
persistently affect equity issuance. According to Frank and Goyal (2009), Titman and 
Wessel (1988), and Fama and French (2005) profitability, firm size, investment 
opportunities, tangibility, growth opportunities and leverage have strong and persistent 
effects on equity issuance. We set two models using those variables in Step I. One 
model is used in the main test, and the other model is used in the robustness test. 
Step I-A is used to estimate equity issuance propensity. We choose a base period 
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1963 to 1977 and use these variables to run year-by-year logit regressions. Equity issue 
is the dependent variable. Dependent variable equals one if firm issue equity, and equals 
zero if not issue equity. We define equity issuance as net equity issuance divided by 
total asset larger than 5%, which follows Baker and Wurgler (2002) definitions for 
yearly equity issuance. Coefficient of each base period variable is estimated for each 
year. The coefficients of each variable then are averaged over the whole base period (in 
the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973)). Firm-level equity issuance probability is 
estimated by applying the average coefficient to the forecast period (1978 to 2014). By 
adding up all probabilities of all firms in a given year, we get the aggregate equity 
issuance. We observe a consistent and significant effect for each variable during 1963 
to 1977. We also try with 1%, and 10% in the robustness tests thresholds to determine 
equity issuances. We also choose other base periods in the robustness tests. 
The value of logit model prediction ranges from zero to one. The aggregate 
number is our predicted propensity to issue for each firm. Propensities for all available 
firms in each year are combined to obtain aggregate propensity for that year. Similarly, 
for each year, we aggregate the number of firms that actually issue equity. 1This is our 
aggregate actual issue for that year.  
Step I-B is used to calculate aggregate equity issuance residual. The difference 
between the aggregate actual and aggregate predicted issues is the yearly residual 
propensity. The resulting propensity is scaled by the total number of firms in that 
particular year. The value of scaled residual propensity ranges from -1 to 1.  
Logit (Equity issuance) = 𝛼+𝛽1MB+𝛽2EBIT_TA+𝛽3Ch_TA_TA+𝛽4LogA         (3.1) 
“MB” is the market-to-book ratio. “EBIT_TA” is earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets, which is a proxy for profitability. “CH_TA_TA” is the 
percentage change of total asset divided by total asset, which is a proxy for growth 
opportunity. “LogA” is the log of total assets, which is a proxy for firm size. We used 
                                                     
1 This process is the same as assigning values of ones for each firm that issues equity in that year. This 
is our actual issue value for each firm. 
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many combinations of firms’ characteristics in the first step to estimate equity 
issuance propensity. In order to choose the most parsimonious model, we perform t-
test for each variable following Fama and Macbeth (1973). Each variable is required 
to have both statistical and economic meanings to be included in the regression. After 
trying many combinations, we decide to set a model as Model (3.1). We also set a 
second model, which will be introduced it in Robustness test, to estimate equity 
issuance. 
Our variables are defined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We also use different ways to calculate residual to issue. We summarize them in 
Table 2. 
                         [Inset Table 2 here] 
3.3.2 Step II 
From Step I, we get the residual propensity to issue equity. In Step II, we test the effects 
of several market timing factors: market-to-book ratio, adverse selection costs, and 
investor sentiment on equity issue residual by controlling for business cycle and general 
capital costs. We define aggregate time-series market-to-book ratio as average market-
to-book ratios of all firms in a given year, weighted by market value of each firm. 
Aggregate time-series stock price synchronicity is a proxy for time-varying adverse 
selection cost. Following French and Roll (1986), Roll (1988), and Morck et al. (2000) 
we define the synchronicity with the following model:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡=𝛼𝑖𝑡+𝛽𝑖𝑡*𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑡                                     (3.2) 
We regress monthly stock return on market return and calculate 𝑅2 s of the 
regressions. Firm-year observations without full 12 months records are excluded. The 
regressions are run for each firm for each year from 1963 to 2014. In order to get yearly 
𝑅2, we weight firm-year 𝑅2 by Total Sum of Squares: 
𝑅𝑡
2=
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ×𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑖
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
                     (3.3) 
𝑅2 is defined as following: 
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𝑅2=
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡−𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡−𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
      (3.4) 
So the lower 𝑅2 indicates more variation in firm-specific variation and less 
synchronicity. 
Following Morck (2000), we calculate yearly stock price synchronicity as  
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡= Log (
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
)                          (3.5) 
Our yearly 𝑅2  is shown in Figure 1 and synchronicity is shown in Figure 2. 
Yearly 𝑅2  varies a lot over years, which indicates information asymmetric levels 
changes over year. Synchronicity changes in the same direction with yearly 𝑅2. Some 
years with lower synchronicity are considered as good market timing as stated in 
previous studies.  
                      [Insert Figure 1 here] 
                      [Insert Figure 2 here] 
We regress aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, and investor sentiment 
on residual to issue during the period 1978 to 2014, excluding our base period (1963 to 
1977). 
We choose one-year Treasury bill rate as a measure of general capital costs. We 
posit that T-bill rate would have a significant and negative effect on equity issuances. 
The higher general capital costs, the less likely firms are to issue equity. We also control 
for the aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, and investor sentiment as the 
main independent variable to see whether the result is consistent with the hypothesis. 
We test three kinds of business cycle indicators: combined leading indicator, combined 
lagging indicator, and combined coincident indicator. Leading indicators change before 
the actual business cycle trend, lagging indicators follow the business cycle trend and 
the coincident indicators with the business cycle trend. 
Our model is stated as: 
Aggregate residual propensity= 𝛽1aggregate time-series M/B +𝛽2aggregate time-series 
stock price synchronicity+𝛽3Sentiment Index+𝛽4Business cycle indicator+𝛽5T-bill rate       
(3.6) 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Our sample covers data ranging from 1963 to 2014 and excludes financial firms (SIC 
6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999) as well as the firms that have missing 
data and negative asset values. Summary statistics of variables used to estimate equity 
issuance are presented in Table 3. The observation is 115014. Average firm size is 4.4 
measured by the log of total asset. Average market-to-book ratio is 1.76, and average 
profitability is 0.033 measured by EBITDA divided by total assets.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
Correlations are presented in Table 4. Most variables are correlated with each other, 
and the correlations are relatively small, except for correlation between T-bill rate and 
aggregate market-to-book ratio.  
                      [Insert Table 4] 
4.2 Logit regressions 
Table 5 summarizes Step I logit regressions that estimate the market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, firm size, and growth opportunities on the likelihood that a firm issues 
equity.  
Our main base period ranges from 1963 to 1977. We also try different base periods 
including 1973 to 1982, 1963 to 1982, and 1973 to 1987 in robustness tests. Model (3.1) 
and Model (3.2) both show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely 
to issue equity; the average slope on MB during 1963 to 1977 is 0.24, and the t-value 
is 46.6. This result is consistent with previous studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Higher market-to-book ratio indicates that individual security is overpriced, or that the 
firm has more growth opportunities. Firms issue equity with higher market-to-book 
ratio can exploit this good timing to gain more profits or raise more capital for the 
growth opportunities.  
Empirical results in Model (3.1) show that profitable firms are less likely to issue 
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equity; the average coefficient is -7 during 1963 to 1977. However, most results from 
Model (3.2) show that profitable firms are more likely to issue equity. Previous studies 
have no consistent result about the effect of profitability on capital structure. Profitable 
firms need less external capital that they have enough internal funds for daily operation 
and for capturing investment opportunities. However, the relationship between 
profitability and capital structure is more complex (Frank and Goyal, 2009).  
Model (3.1) and Model (3.2) provide consistent results regarding the effect of firm 
size on equity issuance that larger firms are less likely to issue equity. Larger firms have  
better reputation and face lower default risk so that they are expected to have more debt. 
Thus, we observe a negative sign for firm size. We use percentage change of total assets 
as a proxy for growth opportunity in Model (3.1) and use capital expenditure divided 
by total asset as a proxy for growth opportunity. Both proxies indicate that firms with 
more growth opportunities issue more equity. Such firms may be riskier, so it is harder 
for them to issue debt. Thus, we predict that growing firms are more likely to issue 
equity to finance. Tangibility is negatively associated with equity issuance. Firms with 
more tangible assets can raise debt at lower costs. Thus, they use debt more than equity. 
All coefficients pass t-tests and are economically meaningful. Coefficients during 
different periods of each variable are consistent.  
Our estimated coefficient during three periods and their t-statistics are shown in 
Table 5. 
                       [Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Estimates for equity issue residual propensity 
The actual equity issuance, our estimation of equity issuance, and the residual 
propensity to issue for each year are shown in Figure 3. 
                          [Insert Figure 3 here] 
Estimated equity issuance changes a lot over time. It appears that equity issuance 
trend has a cycle. It keeps going up for about two years, and is followed by a downward 
trend for two years. For example, equity issuance went up from 1992 to 1994, and went 
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down from 1994 to 1996. The period from 1992 to 1996 can be seen as a cycle. Several 
similar cycle can be seen in the following period. Equity issuances dramatically 
declined in 2008, which may be attributable to the subprime crisis, and our estimation 
of equity issuance successfully captures this downward trend in 2008. We can also 
observe many similar trends with actual equity issuance and estimated issuance. Thus, 
we get a consistent estimate of the residual propensity. The similar pattern indicates our 
model captures consistent effects of firms’ characteristics, and that the residual 
propensity cannot be explained by firm-specific reasons anymore, and some more 
factors are needed.  
4.4 What factors really matter in market timing 
We regress residual propensity to issue on aggregate market-to-book ratio, business 
cycle indicators, investor sentiment indicator, T-bill rate, and synchronicity. Results are 
shown in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Step II captures actual important factors in market timing. Our results show 
synchronicity and aggregate market-to-book ratio are significantly associated with the 
residual propensity to issue. Firms are more likely to issue equity during periods of 
lower adverse selection costs. When synchronicity is higher, there is less firm-specific 
information priced in the stock, and higher adverse selection costs exist. At this time, 
firms avoid issuing equity. This result is consistent with static pecking order theory. 
Managers realize a favorable market condition by capturing the signs of lower adverse 
selection costs and try to take advantage of this opportunities by issuing more equity. 
By testing with a new methodology, we provide a more reliable evidence that directly 
proves rational assumption of market timing.  
Aggregate market-to-book ratio shows significant and positive effects on the 
residual propensity to issue. Firms exploit good market conditions, and individual 
valuation is a very important factor in the decision process. Higher market-to-book ratio 
indicates a better market condition, and managers do take this into consideration in 
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making equity issue decision. 
When we add investor sentiment into regression, we observe sentiment has no 
significant effect on residual propensity to issue. Our first hypothesis is rejected. 
Previous studies, such as Baker and Wurgler (2006), provide evidence that sentiment 
has strong effects on stock returns or prices, and thus affect stock valuation. This effect 
on stock valuation might change market-to-book ratio and finally affect equity issuance. 
However, after controlling for aggregate market-to-book ratio and synchronicity, 
sentiment has no significant direct effect on residual propensity to issue. Managers time 
the market to take advantage of favorable market conditions based on the market-to-
book ratio and adverse selection costs but not directly on sentiment itself. 
Some studies, including that of Choe et al (1993), provide evidence that firms are 
more likely to issue equity in hot market during expansion period and are less likely to 
issue equity during contraction period. We regress residual propensity to issue on 
business cycle indicators: leading indicators, lagging indicators and coincident 
indicators. Our empirical results show that after controlling for market-to-book ratio 
and stock adverse selection costs, business cycle indicator does not matter in equity 
issue decisions. 
Previous studies provide two perspectives to explain the market timing. Rational 
view states that managers measure market timing to reduce adverse selection costs. Our 
results support this view. Irrational view believes sentiment affect stocks prices, stock 
valuation, and finally the equity issuance. However, our results show sentiment does 
not play a major role in the residual propensity to issue after controlling for market-to-
book ratio and synchronicity. The horse race between rational adverse selection costs 
and irrational sentiment come to a conclusion that adverse selection costs play a more 
important role in market timing than sentiment does. 
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5. Robustness tests 
We set a model to estimate aggregate equity issue residual propensity to issue in step I. 
to check if our model and tests are reliable, we provide many different ways to estimate 
the Step I and redo the second stage tests based on our estimations. We use the following 
model in the first step. 
Logit (Equity issuance) = 𝛼+𝛽1MB+𝛽2EBITDA_TA+𝛽3Ch_TA+𝛽4LogA+ 𝛽5CapEx+𝛽6Lev 
(5.1) 
We perform t-tests for each variable during different periods as shown in Table 5. 
All coefficients are significant and meaningful, which provides a reliable estimation for 
equity issuance. Variables details are discussed in the methodology section.  
Our first robustness test is based on Model (5.1) with the base period 1963 to 1977. 
Net equity issuance dummy takes on the value of one when the value of net equity 
issues scaled by total value of assets higher than 5%, zero otherwise. The entire process 
is similar to the one we did in the main test, and empirical results are shown in Table 7. 
 [Insert Table 7] 
Our second robustness test is based on Model (5.1) with the base period 1963 to 
1982. Net equity issuance dummy takes on the value of one when the value of net equity 
issues scaled by total value of assets higher than 5%, zero otherwise. The second step 
test starts from 1983 to 2014 as excluding tests. The process is similar to the main test. 
Empirical results are shown in Table 8. Results are consistent with the main tests. 
 [Insert Table 8] 
Our third robustness test is based on Model (5.1) with the base period 1963 to 
1977. Net equity issuance dummy takes on the value of one when the value of net equity 
issues scaled by total value of assets higher than 1%, zero otherwise. Results are shown 
in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9] 
The last robustness test is based on Model (5.1) with the base period 1963 to 1987. 
Net equity issuance dummy takes on the value of one when the value of net equity 
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issues scaled by total value of assets higher than 1%, zero otherwise. Results are shown 
in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10] 
All robustness tests have similar results to our main tests. Consistent results show 
that our conclusions are reliable. Aggregate market-to-book ratio is significantly and 
positively associated with residual propensity to issue. Higher market-to-book ratio 
associated with higher propensity to issue. Synchronicity has the significant and 
negative effect on the residual propensity to issue. After controlling for synchronicity, 
investor sentiment has no direct effect on residual propensity to issue. T-bill rate and 
business cycle do not have significant effects on residual propensity to issue after 
controlling for aggregate market-to-book ratio and synchronicity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
6. Conclusion 
Firms tend to time the market conditions by taking advantage of favorable market 
conditions by issuing more equity. From the rational view, firms take adverse selection 
costs into consideration in their financial decisions. Our results provide direct evidence 
that managers time the market to reduce information cost, and adverse selection cost 
directly and significantly affects equity issuance. Lower adverse selection cost is 
considered as the favorable market condition that firms might issue equity at lower 
costs, and thus firms prefer to issue more equity. The period with higher adverse 
selection cost is taken as unfavorable market condition, and firms avoid issuing equity. 
Irrational view for market timing phenomenon assumes that the investor sentiment 
might affect stock returns and prices, and finally affect equity issue. We test adverse 
selection costs and sentiment together in the model to compare these two factors. After 
controlling for aggregate market-to-book ratio and adverse selection costs, sentiment 
does not have a strong effect on residual propensity to issue. Our empirical results show 
that adverse selection cost is more important in the market timing decision than 
sentiment. Sentiment has no direct effect on equity issue.  
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Appendix 
Table 1-A Variables Definitions  
Variable 
mnemonic 
Name Computation 
BE Book Equity 
Total Asset [data6]-Total Liabilities [data181]-Preferred 
Stock[data10]+Deferred Taxes[data35]+Convertible 
Debt[data79]. 
BD Book Debt Total Asset[data6]-Book Equity[be] 
BL 
Book 
Leverage 
Book Debt/Total Assets[data6]*100 
ME 
Market 
Equity 
Common Shares Outstanding[data25]*Price[data199] 
ML 
Market 
Leverage 
Book Debt/(Total Assets[data6]-Book Equity+Market 
Equity)*100 
E 
Net Equity 
Issues 
Change in Book Equity-Change in Balance Sheet Retained 
Earnings[data36] 
E_TA 
Net Equity 
Issues 
E/Total Assets[data6] 
RE_TA 
Newly 
Retained 
Earnings 
Change in Retained Earnings[data36]/Total Assets[data6] 
D 
Net Debt 
Issuesd 
Change in Total Assets-e-Change in Retained Earnings 
D_TA 
Net Debt 
Issuesd 
D/Total Assets [data6] 
MB 
Market to 
Book ratio 
(Total Assets[data6]-Book Equity+Market Equity)/Total 
Assets[6] 
PPE_TA 
Asset 
tangibility 
Net Plant, Property and Equipment[8]/Total Assets[6] 
EBITDA_TA Profitability 
Earnings before Interest, Taxes and 
Depreciation[data13]/Total Assets[data6] 
LogA Size Log(Total Assets) 
LogS Size Log(Sale) 
DIV_BE 
Dividends 
over Book 
Equity 
Common Stock Dividends[data21]/Book Equity 
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Table 1-B Variables Definitions  
Variable 
mnemonic 
Name Computation 
DIV_ME 
Dividends over Market 
Equity 
Common Stock Dividends[data21]/Market 
Equity 
DEP_TA 
Depreciation Expense 
to Assets 
Depreciation Expense[data14]/Total 
Assets[data6] 
RD_TA R&D to Assets 
Research and Development[data46]/Total 
Assets[data6] 
LEV leverage Long-term Debt/Total Assets 
LEVEL leverage (Total Assets-BE)/Total Assets 
SLACKS slacks Cash and Short-Term Investments/Total Assets 
r yearly returns downloaded from CRSP 
Ch_TA_TA Growth opportunity Percentage change of total assets divided by 
total assets 
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Table 2: Different ways to calculate residual propensity to issue equity 
 
Different ways definition 
Model 2 Logit (Equity issue) = MB+EBITDA_TA+PPE_TA+LogA+CapEx+Lev 
Residual 2 
we treat E/TA bigger than 5% as equity issued, and choose base time 
period from 1963-1977 
Residual 3 
we treat E/TA bigger than 5% as equity issued, and choose base time 
period from 1963-1982 
Residual 4 
we treat E/TA bigger than 1% as equity issued, and choose base time 
period from 1963-1977 
Residual 5 
we treat E/TA bigger than 1% as equity issued, and choose base time 
period from 1963-1987 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics of the main independent variables for the Step I. The data range covers 1963 to 2014, and all the data is from COMPUSTAT 
and is winsorized at 0.01 level. MB is the market-to-book ratio. EBITDA_TA is the EBITDA divided by the total asset. We use it to measure the profitability 
of firms. PPE_TA is PPE divided by the total asset. We use it as the measurement of tangibility. LogA is the log of total asset, and LogS is the log of sales. We 
use these two variables to measure firm size. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset. We use it as firm growth. Lev is Long-term Debt to Total 
Assets. XSGA is Selling, General, and Administrative Expense. Slack is Cash and Short-Term Investments/Total Assets. We use slack to measure cash flow conditions. 
 
 
Variable obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
MB 102452 1.766 1.711 0.499 17.101 
EBITDA_TA 115014 0.033 0.415 -3.774 0.434 
PPE_TA 115351 0.304 0.235 0 0.919 
LogA 115497 4.451 2.471 -1.796 10.424 
LogS 112571 4.481 2.577 -2.733 10.3 
CAPEx 113538 0.057 0.059 0 0.438 
LEV 115462 0.172 0.202 0 1.114 
XSGA 104079 213.72 704.301 0.079 1449.715 
SLACK 115475 0.174 0.216 -0.269 1 
EBIT_TA 115360 -0.019 0.429 -3.939 0.381 
Ch_TA_TA 115497 -0.033 0.362 -2.288 0.87 
 
  
 
3
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Table 4 Correlations  
This table presents correlation statistics of the dependent variables for the second step. aggmb is the aggregate market to book ratio, which is calculated by 
weighting each year’s all market-to-book ratio by firm’s market value. Synchronicity is the calculated following Morck (2002) to measure the adverse selection 
costs. Sentiment is investor sentiment. We got the data from Baker and Wurgler website. T bill ratio is the one-year Treasury bill rate. Lagging, leading, and 
coind the business cycle indictor. Then residual 1 is the independent variable.  
 
                  
  aggmb synchronicity sentiment tbill lagging leading coind residual1 
aggmb 1               
synchronicity 0.0186 1             
sentiment -0.0088 -0.0394 1           
tbill -0.6723 0.046 0.3075 1         
lagging -0.1097 -0.1858 0.0624 0.1573 1       
leading 0.0675 -0.3411 -0.1093 -0.1369 -0.4543 1     
coind -0.034 -0.3744 -0.0022 -0.0589 0.4833 0.3775 1   
residual1 0.559 -0.3877 0.4376 -0.5033 0.1174 0.0634 0.2746 1 
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Table 5 T-tests-Model 1 
Logit regression to estimate coefficients for Model 3.1 
We run logit regression year-by-year based on three time periods as shown in the table and average the yearly coefficients to get the average coefficients. The 
dependent variable is 1 if that during year firm issue equity, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are market-to-book ratio, EBIT_TA (EBIT divided by 
total asset), LogA (log of total asset) Ch_TA_TA (the growth rate of assets). The following table shows the average coefficient for each variable during three 
time periods and t-statistics for the mean. We defined t-statistics, following Fama and MacBeth (1973), as the mean divided by its standard error (the times-
series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by the square root of the number of years in the period). 
 
Average coefficient 
  Intercept MB EBIT_TA LogA Ch_TA_TA 
1963-1977 -1.96*** 0.24*** -7.01*** -0.09*** 13.77*** 
1973-1982 -2.24*** 0.33*** -5.43*** -0.07*** 8.58*** 
1963-1982 -1.77*** 0.27*** -6.11*** -0.09*** 9.66*** 
1973-1987 -1.68*** 0.3*** -5.53*** -0.06*** 6.36*** 
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Table 5 T-tests-Model 2 
Logit regression to estimate coefficients: Model 3.2 
We run logit regression year by year based on three periods as shown in the table and average the yearly coefficients to get the average coefficients. The 
dependent variable is one if year issue equity at that year, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are Market to book ratio, EBITDA_TA (EBITDA 
divided by total asset), PPE_TA (PP&E divided by total asset), LogA (log of total asset), CapEx (capital expenditure divided by total asset), and Lev (leverage, 
long-term debt divided by total asset). The following table shows average coefficient for each variable during three periods and t-statistics for the mean. We 
defined t-statistics, following Fama and MacBeth (1973), as the mean divided by its standard error (the times-series standard deviation of the regression 
coefficient divided by the square root of the number of years in the period) 
 
Average coefficient 
  Intercept MB EBITDA_TA PPE_TA LogA CapEx Lev 
1963-1982 -2.76*** 0.2*** 0.59*** -1.01*** -0.03*** 4.43*** 1.22*** 
1963-1977 -2.97*** 0.19*** 0.73*** -1.21*** -0.02*** 4.84*** 1.55*** 
1963-1987 -2.4*** 0.18*** 0.43*** -1.11*** -0.04*** 4.37*** 1.04*** 
1973-1982 -2.74*** 0.39*** -0.43*** -1.31*** -0.07*** 9.67*** 0.56*** 
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Table 6 Regression results 
This table presents the second step regression results. The second regression results from the regressing residual propensity to issue on aggregate market to book ratio 
and synchronicity. aggmb is the aggregate market to book ratio, and we use it to measure yearly cumulative valuation. Synchronicity is calculated from yearly r square, 
and we use it to measure yearly adverse selection costs. The third regression results from regressing residual propensity to issue on aggregate market to book ratio, 
synchronicity and investor sentiment. Investor sentiment is downloaded from Baker and Wurgler website, which measuring the investors prospect for the stock. The 
forth regression results from regressing residual propensity to issue on aggregate market to book ratio, synchronicity, investor sentiment and Treasury bill rate. The last 
column results from regressing residual propensity to issue on aggregate market to book ratio, synchronicity and coincident, which is the business cycle indicator. All 
the tests are adjusted with a t-test using Newey-West adjusted standard errors with lag 2. 
  
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aggmb  3.00821***  3.612581***  4.175977***   2.768282***  3.591177*** 
    .710177   .7361936  .8498681   .8154319  .753398  
synchronicity    -4.567293***   -4.998165***  -4.030943***  -4.347071*** 
     1.857257   2.023497  1.799957  1.961306 
sentiment      .5640711     
      1.174885      
tbill       -.3128924   
         .2165562   
coind          .0872198 
           .2356012  
N 37 37 33 37 37 
data range 1978-2014 1978-2014 1978-2010 1978-2014 1978-2014 
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Table 7 Robustness Test- Residual 2 
Dependent variable is residual 2. We use Model: 
Logit(issuance)=MB+EBITDA_TA+PPE_TA+LogA+CapEx+Lev with base time period 1963 to 
1977 at 5% to estimate residual 2. “MB” is the market-to-book ratio. “EBITDA_TA” is the 
EBITDA divided by total assets. PPE_TA is the tangibility assets divided by total assets. “LogA” 
is the log of total assets. “CapEX” is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. “Lev” is the 
leverage. We use this model in the first step using the same process with main tests to estimate 
residual to issue. In the Step II, we test aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, sentiment, 
t-bill rate, and business cycle  
 
 
residual2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aggmb  2.633102*** 3.572348***  4.323088***  2.62231***   3.51459*** 
   .9546918 .884018  .9515534   1.061358  .9006599 
synchronicity    -7.097975***   -7.806692***  -6.494453***  -6.503719*** 
    2.458452  2.686342 2.337404   2.575795  
sentiment     .7518704     
       1.419998      
tbill       -.3520789   
        .294244    
coind         .2353574  
           .2572417  
N 37 37 33 37 37 
data range 1978-2014 1978-2014 1978-2010 1978-2014 1978-2014 
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Table 8 Robustness Test- Residual 3 
Dependent variable is residual 3. We use Model: Logit (issuance) = 
MB+EBITDA_TA+PPE_TA+LogA+CapEx+Lev with base period 1963 to 1982 at 5% to estimate 
residual 3. “MB” is the market-to-book ratio. “EBITDA_TA” is the EBITDA divided by total 
assets. PPE_TA is the tangibility assets divided by total assets. “LogA” is the log of total assets. 
“CapEX” is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. “Lev” is the leverage. We use this 
model in the first step using the same process with main tests to estimate residual to issue. In the 
Step II, we test aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, sentiment, t-bill rate, and business 
cycle  
 
 
residual3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aggmb 1.436708***  2.213492***   2.97523***  2.392841***   2.192068*** 
   .8192217   .8327283  .8512964  .9883159 .8236238 
synchronicity     -3.796411***  -4.469116***  -3.806716***  -3.429108*** 
    1.917867  2.377584   1.945449  1.952874 
sentiment     1.9729      
      1.967588     
tbill       .0962786   
         .5702789   
coind         .1570626  
           .2051425  
N 32 32 28 32 32 
data range 1983-2014 1983-2014 1983-2010 1983-2014 1983-2014 
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Table 9 Robustness Test- Residual 4 
Dependent variable is residual 4. We use Model: 
Logit(issuance)=MB+EBITDA_TA+PPE_TA+LogA+CapEx+Lev with base time period 1963 to 
1977 at 1% to estimate residual 4. “MB” is the market-to-book ratio. “EBITDA_TA” is the 
EBITDA divided by total assets. PPE_TA is the tangibility assets divided by total assets. “LogA” 
is the log of total assets. “CapEX” is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. “Lev” is the 
leverage. We use this model in the first step using the same process with main tests to estimate 
residual to issue. In the Step II, we test the aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, 
sentiment, t-bill rate, and business cycle  
 
 
residual4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aggmb 1.784887***  2.761944***    3.41433***  1.908295***   2.694084*** 
  .9048206   .7700105   .8285212 .9520185 .7831457  
synchronicity     -7.383715***  -7.939837***  -6.841426***  -6.685519*** 
     2.305469   2.556505  2.25832 2.41182  
sentiment      .8666896     
      1.391073     
tbill       -.3163576   
         .2521686    
coind          .2765232 
           .2301057 
N 37 37 33 37 37 
data range 1978-2014 1978-2014 1978-2010 1978-2014 1978-2014 
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Table 10 Robustness Test- Residual 5 
Dependent variable is residual 5. We use Model: Logit(issuance)=MB+EBITDA_TA+PPE_TA+LogA+CapEx+Lev with base time period 1963 to 1987 at 1% to 
estimate residual 5. “MB” is the market-to-book ratio. “EBITDA_TA” is the EBITDA divided by total assets. PPE_TA is the tangibility assets divided by total assets. 
“LogA” is the log of total assets. “CapEX” is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. “Lev” is the leverage. We use this model in the first step using the same 
process with main tests to estimate residual to issue. In the Step II, we test the aggregate market-to-book ratio, synchronicity, sentiment, t-bill rate, and business cycle  
 
 
residual5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aggmb 2.258692***  3.909064***    4.086619***  3.284291***   3.790126*** 
   1.02308   1.098049  1.008574  1.060923  1.083009 
synchronicity     -5.636463***  -4.962052***   -6.21432***  -5.172445*** 
    1.223321  1.228331 1.472746  1.403821  
sentiment      2.103647      
      1.640193     
tbill       -.4632222    
        .6347811    
coind         .0918208  
          .2188787 
N 25 25 23 25 25 
data range 1988-2014 1988-2014 1988-2010 1988-2014 1988-2014 
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Figure 1 Yearly R Square. 
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
ye
ar
1
9
64
1
9
66
1
9
68
1
9
70
1
9
72
1
9
74
1
9
76
1
9
78
1
9
80
1
9
82
1
9
84
1
9
86
1
9
88
1
9
90
1
9
92
1
9
94
1
9
96
1
9
98
2
0
00
2
0
02
2
0
04
2
0
06
2
0
08
2
0
10
2
0
12
2
0
14
R square
R square
 44 
 
Figure 2 Yearly synchronicity 
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Figure 3 Residual propensity to issue Equity 
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